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Abstract—In the Internet of Thing, data is almost collected, ag-
gregated and analyzed without human intervention by machine-
to-machine communications resulting in raising serious chal-
lenges on access control. Particularly in Smart City ecosystems
in which multi-modal data comes from heterogeneous sources,
data owners cannot imagine how their data is used to extract
sensitive information. Thus, there is a critical need for novel
access control methods that minimize privacy risks while increase
ability of personalized access control. Our solution is to build a
trust-based usage control mechanism called TUCON that enables
stakeholders to set access control policies based on their trust
relationships with data consumers. In this study, we introduce two
novel paradigms integrated in the Smart City shared platform:
a Trust Service Platform and a Data Usage Control, then bring
them together to establish the new mechanism. The conceptual
model, the architecture, the formalization, and the practical
development of TUCON is described in detail. We also show
the roles and the interactions of TUCON components in the
Smart City platform. Our contributions lie in a new trust
model with a trust computation procedure based on semantic
web technologies, a novel trust-based usage control conceptual
model including a formalization, a practical expression and
an architecture for Smart City systems. We believe this study
provides better understanding on both trust and usage control
in the Internet of Things and opens several important research
directions in the future.
Index Terms—Trust; Usage Control; Trust-based Usage Con-
trol; TUCON; Smart City; Trust Metric; Ontology
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have been witnessing an important
network paradigm the Internet of Things (IoT) which has
imposed various research areas in many types of network
environments. In IoT infrastructure, billions of electronic ob-
jects are connected ranging from small and low computation
capability devices such as Radio Frequency Identification
tags (RFIDs) to complex ones such as smartphones, smart
appliances and smart vehicles. It is expected there will be more
than 50 billion connected devices by 2020, approximately
6.58 devices per person on our planet [1]. The increases in
quantity and connectivity result in rocketing flow of data.
In IoT, most of data is collected, aggregated and mined
without human intervention by machine-to-machine (M2M)
communications that could lead to difficulties in complying
privacy and security. Dangerously, a great portion of data
owners are not aware of how their data is used. Particularly, in
an environment like Smart City in which multi-modal infor-
mation coming from heterogeneous sources such as location,
traffic, weather, gasoline and electronic usages [2], data can
be aggregated and analyzed by malicious participants to infer
private information. Moreover, stakeholders also have less
opportunity to learn about data-usage practices. These reasons
will aggravate problems on data privacy and data sharing
in Smart City. However, in order to reach full potential of
intelligent and complex services, sharing data among various
kinds of resources is a must. Thus, a new access control
model to cope with the emerging requirements in Smart City
ecosystems is an urgent need.
Our previous studies have proposed a conceptual model and
a handling mechanism for data access control in Smart City
based on Usage Control (UCON) in which stakeholders can
put their preferences in forms of constrains and obligations on
data usage [3] [4]. However, the proposed model cannot cope
with many complex scenarios. For example, a commercial
company requests all details of energy usage data on an hourly
basis but the stakeholder sets a policy that only institutional
actors are permitted to access data in detail whereas commer-
cial operators are permitted only statistical data on a weekly
basis. This is because the data owner thinks that institutional
operators are securer than commercial actors. We believe that
stakeholders only share data if they trust participants regardless
the type of actors. The success of any data sharing platform
depends on the compliance on data protection regulations and,
beyond legal obligations, on the trust relationships between
stakeholders and data consumers.
Our solution is to integrate a trust service platform to a
UCON mechanism called Trust-based Usage Control (TU-
CON) that can guarantee that data is only permitted to access
and obligate by trusted sources. TUCON offers several benefits
such as a policy enforcement that can be based on attributes of
stakeholders and consumers, on obligation actions, and on trust
relationships. It offers data abstraction and data monetization
features, and also offers the on-the-go usage control decision
that adapts with environment changes. The main contributions
in this paper are following: (i) a novel trust service platform
including a trust model, a system architecture, and a trust
computation procedure. (ii) TUCON: a novel usage control
conceptual model and architecture that considers three basic
UCON factors: authorizations, obligations and conditions re-
garding to the trust platform. (iii) We provide formalization
and prototype for the both trust service platform and TUCON
including data abstraction, data annotation, semantic creation,
and reasoning mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides background and related work on trust and usage
control. Section III introduces the proposed trust model, the
trust architecture, the trust computation procedure, and the
practical development of the trust service platform. Section IV
is dedicated to characterize TUCON including the conceptual
model and the system architecture. Section V focuses on
the practical expression and the prototype implementation
of TUCON. We conclude our work and outline research
directions in the last section.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Trust in IoT
Trust plays an important role in supporting both people and
services to overcome perception of uncertainty and risk when
making a decision. Trust interplays among humans, social
sciences and computer science, affected by both objective
factors (direct information) and subjective factors (third-party
information) from physical properties to social relations [5].
In this regard, trust is a computational value depicted by
relationships among a trustor, a trustee and other entities,
described in a specific context, measured by Trust Metrics
(TMs); and evaluated by a trust computation mechanism. In
IoT, the trustor and the trustee can be human or machine, and
the context is expressed as a service in a specific environment.
Our previous research has investigated the trust relationship
between users and vehicles in a context considering Car
Sharing service in Smart City ecosystems [6]. Trust has been
accepted as one of the key factors for enhancing user privacy
and system security, and for establishing seamless connectivity
and reliable services. Recently, many research groups have
been intensively working on trust-related areas in various
environments from peer to peer (P2P) to IoT, varying in many
applications from access control [7] to e-commerce [8] [9].
B. Usage Control
UCON is a new access control model initially proposed by
Sandhu and Park [10] with a purpose of being addressed to
emerging digital environments that can apply in various access
control situations. UCON enables two advanced features to
cope with dynamic networking environment: (i) the mutability
of attributes, and (ii) the continuity of an access decision.
Basically, UCON keeps track of changes of attributes and
policies when the access is in progress, results in being able
to change permission decisions. Then an authorization system
revokes granted rights or terminates resource usages accord-
ingly. The permission decisions are determined based on three
factors called Authorizations, Obligations and Conditions.
Authorizations are predicates over subjects (data consumers)
and/or objects (stakeholders, data) attributes; put constrains on
them to judge; and then grant the subjects a certain right on
the objects. Obligations is a novel component in UCON model
for examining the accomplishment of compulsory tasks that
subjects have being done to objects before, during and after
the access period. Conditions are constrains from environment
attributes, not related to both subjects and objects but affect
the usage decision process [11].
A notable advantage of UCON is the expressiveness of
policies and obligations applied in various access scenarios.
UCON not only conveys capability of existing access control
models but also goes beyond them. It has been widely accepted
to be a prospective access control model for dynamic and open
networking systems like Smart City.
C. Related Work
There are a large amount of research literature that lever-
ages UCON for data sharing in some environments such
as Social Network, Cloud Computing, IoT and Smart City.
UCON features and challenges have been well studied in
a survey conducted by A. Lazouski and his colleagues in
[12]. Authors in [11] have extended traditional access con-
trol models for providing obligations and conditions when
accessing enterprise resources, forming a simple usage control
mechanism. An accountability model with an architecture
have been proposed in [13], allowing participants to explore
consequences of different usage control policies. A privacy
model has been proposed in [14] in which semantic web
technologies are utilized for supplying a privacy model and for
offering users to impose their preferences and control over data
in Smart Grid environment. We have continued our previous
studies on data usage control [3] [4] by integrating the trust
platform introduced in [6]. We believe TUCON will open
several approaches for trust-based usage control model in IoT
ecosystems.
III. TRUST SERVICE PLATFORM
The trust platform cooperates with services and works as an
underlying service (Trust as a Service - TaaS) to offer securer
transactions and better quality of service (QoS) and experience
(QoE).
A. RRK Trust Model
Despite a large amount of trust-related research, a stan-
dardization of trust model is still under investigation [15]. We
follow a conceptual trust model described in [6] as follows:
∙ Trust is based on TMs, each TM is generally defined as
the measurement of an aspect of trust.
∙ Each TM is calculated based on Technical Attributes
(TAs). TAs are information that can be measured or
extracted from data in networking environments such as
Smart City systems.
In social science, people base on three sources of in-
formation to judge trust: public evidences (as reputation),
opinions from surroundings (as recommendation), and their
own understandings (as knowledge). We believe this process
of trust evaluation can be applied for IoT system. Based on
the conceptual model, a trust model called RRK is proposed
comprised of Reputation, Recommendation, and Knowledge
as three TMs. Each TM is derived from other sub-TMs or
TAs that represent for trust aspects in Social-Cyber-Physical
(SCP) world (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: The proposed RRK Trust Model
There are two methods to derive TMs from TAs and the
trust value from TMs. The first method uses mathematical
models such as weighted sum, Bayesian neutron networks
[16], heuristic algorithms [17] or Google PageRank-like al-
gorithms [9] for computing some sorts of TMs and TAs such
as Recommendation and Reputation. The second method uses
inference engines for inferring trust-related knowledge from a
knowledge base to evaluate some TAs or relative trust values
(i.e ”level of trust”).
B. Trust Computation System
To judge trust, sufficient data about the trustor, the trustee
and the trust context needs to be collected, annotated, aggre-
gated, and processed for creating a set of semantic information,
which is a part of the trust knowledge base. The rest of the
knowledge base are rules acquired by conducting a knowledge
acquisition mechanism. The trust knowledge base is the input
of an inference engine to reason the trust value. And based on
this value, access control decisions are made accordingly. The
processes to obtain the trust value are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: The processes of the Trust Computation procedure
1) From Data to Semantic Information: Trust-related data
is collected from various sorts of sources in Smart City. For
example temperature, time, location are from physical objects
like sensors and devices; up-time, bandwidth, packet delivery
rate are from networking components in cyber-space; and
relationships and exchanged information are from social media
like Twitter and Facebook in social-space. The integration of
SCP data enables the incorporation of situation and context-
awareness, thus enabling intelligent autonomous applications
and services [18]. This leads to a need for a data integration
and annotation framework associated with a data model and
a knowledge representation. The framework is also required
for enhancing semantic interoperability for handling semantic
information. State-of-the-art semantic web technologies could
be used for trust modeling, data integration, and data query.
For example, ontology1 is used to represent trust and TUCON
domain-specific models. Fig. 3 shows the upper ontology for
RRK used in our implementation.
Fig. 3: The RRK Trust Model is represented in form of ontology (Trust Upper Ontology)
Based on the trust ontologies, data is annotated accordingly
using RDF schema (RDFS)2 as meta-data and semantic in-
formation (Listing1). Note that only interested information is
captured in accordance with the ontologies.
1 rrk:knowledge_001 a rrk:Knowledge,
owl:NamedIndividual;
2 rrk:hasValue "Medium"ˆˆxsd:string;
3 rrk:hasPhysical rrk:physical_001;
4 rrk:hasCyber rrk:cyber_001;
5 rrk:hasSocial rrk:social_001.
6 rrk:reputation_001 a rrk:Reputation,
owl:NamedIndividual;
7 rrk:hasValue "High"ˆˆxsd:string;
8 rrk:hasCalculatedValue 0.15.
9 rrk:recommendation_001 a rrk:Recommendation,
owl:NamedIndividual;
10 rrk:hasValue "Medium"ˆˆxsd:string;
11 rrk:hasCalculatedValue 0.45.
12 rrk:trust_001 a rrk:Trust, owl:NamedIndividual;
13 rrk:hasValue "High"ˆˆxsd:string.
Listing 1: RDFS data for an individual of RRK Trust Model.
The data can be published using Linked Data so that it is
interlinked and enabled to semantic queries [19]. Several RDF-
query languages such as SPARQL [20], an SQL-like language,
can be used to query the triple store.
2) From Semantic Information to Trust Knowledge Base:
The trust knowledge base contains structured and unstructured
information represented in a machine-interpretable language in
1Web Ontology Language by W3C: https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview
2RDF 1.1 Primer, W3C: https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf11-primer
order for reasoning trust value by using an inference engine.
The creation of the trust knowledge base includes the creation
of facts about trust (declarative knowledge) and the creation
of logic among concepts contained in the facts (procedural
knowledge) [21]. In the trust prototype, we use a knowledge
representation formalism combining both rule-based language
and ontology for supplying reasoning capabilities. Specifically,
the semantic information extracted in the first process is con-
verted into facts in form of Description Logics [22]. The rules
can be monotonic or non-monotonic to express knowledge on
ontologies such as classes, sub-classes, instances and relations.
The rules are the most important part of the knowledge base
which interpret meanings and describe relationships of the
concepts in the facts. Depending on rule-based languages
being used, rules are encoded in different syntaxes such as
Jena3 and Pellet4.
The process to create rules for the knowledge base is
called knowledge acquisition, a part of knowledge engineering.
It is a complicated process that acquires knowledge from
many resources such as user preferences, domain experts,
documents, Internet resources, etc., using various methods
such as interview with human; data mining and machine
learning over data and Internet resources [23]. In the prototype,
for simplicity, the rules are predefined. For instance, a Jena
rule for evaluating Knowledge TM is as below:
knowledge_001_rule1:
(rrk:physical_001 rrk:hasValue "high"),
(rrk:cyber_001 rrk:hasValue "low"ˆˆ),
(rrk:social_001 rrk:hasValue "medium")
-> (rrk:knowledge_001 rrk:hasValue "medium")
The meaning of the rule is that: if values of the three Physical,
Cyber, Social sub-TMs are ”high”, ”low”, and ”medium”,
respectively, then the value of the Knowledge TM is ”medium”
3) Trust Reasoning Mechanism: Based on facts and rules,
inference engines can draw new knowledge that we are inter-
ested, i.e ”level of trust”. In this study, the trust value is sim-
plicity defined in three levels: low, medium and high meaning
as distrust, normal and trust, respectively. The reasoner takes
the trust knowledge base as its input and infers new knowledge
as new facts, resulting in additional rules in the knowledge
base being triggered; then new facts could be created. This
process would iterate until a goal has been reached or until
no rules can be matched. We use Apache Jena framework
that supports various types of integrated inference engines
with forward chaining, tabled backward chaining, and hybrid
reasoning strategies for our demonstration.
C. Trust Service Platform Architecture in Smart City
The trust platform architecture is called Trust Analysis
and Management Platform (TAMP) that comprises of four
components namely Reputation System, Trust Agent, Trust
Broker and Trust Engine (Fig.4). It is introduced and described
3https://jena.apache.org
4https://github.com/complexible/pellet
in detail in our previous work [6]. In the section IV, we
will describe how the components of TAMP and TUCON are
incorporated in the Smart City shared platform.
Fig. 4: Components and Interactions in the Trust Service Platform
IV. TRUST-BASED USAGE CONTROL MECHANISM
A. TUCON Conceptual Model
The initial step in the design of any UCON mechanism is
to identify the objects to be protected and the subjects that
request to access and perform actions on objects. Actions
are obligations describing how the objects are exploited by
the subjects. It is needed to define Access Rights associated
with each of the Obligations; and define the Authorizations
that predicate the access rights based on attributes (ATT(O)),
subjects attributes (ATT(S)) and the environment attributes (as
Conditions). In TUCON, the objects are dataset owned by
stakeholders, the subjects are data consumers, the conditions
are the trust relationship between data owners and data con-
sumers (Fig. 5). The details of this model is clearly described
in section V.
Fig. 5: TUCON conceptual model.
B. TUCON System Architecture
The architecture is built associated with the 3-layered Smart
City shared platform proposed in [24] [25]. The three layers
are Infrastructure Layer (INF), Platform Layer (PLA) and
Application Layer (APP). The platform is to deal with data
acquisition and data annotation from deployed sensors that
are exploited by multiple applications and services. The Data
Manager (DM) is to work with IoT data and resources from
INF whereas the Application Manager (AM) works as an
interface between application and PLA. The Ontology Man-
ager (OM) is also introduced for data annotation and for
supporting Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) services using
domain ontologies such as Semantic Sensor Networks (SSN)
in [26].
Fig. 6: The proposed TUCON architecture in the smart city shared platform
The TUCON architecture is developed by incorporating
TAMP with UCON components into the 3-layered shared
platform. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the three mutual components
are shared between TAMP and TUCON: Rule Manager (RM),
Inference Engine (IE) and Domain Ontology (DO).
∙ RM is for handling rules in the trust knowledge base in
TAMP as well as authorization policies in TUCON. Note
that the rules describe the relationships among classes
and individuals in the ontologies, thus, incurs interactions
among RM, DO and OM. RM directly interacts with
Users for acquiring user preferences in the form of
rules (in case of TUCON). RM also interacts with Trust
Brokers for the user preferences (in case of TAMP).
∙ IE implements some reasoners for inferring new facts and
trust values in TAMP; and for inferring access rights in
TUCON. TUCON and TAMP can use same or different
reasoners depending on their formalization types. In this
study, we use Description Logics with Ontology for trust
and Defeasible Logics (DL) for usage control formaliza-
tions, resulting in different reasoning mechanisms being
used.
∙ DO is a manager for handling domain-specific ontologies,
and for cooperating with OM for data annotation and
data abstraction in both TAMP and TUCON. DO directly
works with Network/Service Manager for ontology up-
date.
V. PRACTICAL EXPRESSION AND PROTOTYPE
A. DataItems
A Data Item is an individual of Context Element container
proposed in the NGSI 9/10 Information Model5 that is used
to exchange information about an entity, including entity ID,
context attributes, related attribute domains, and meta-data for
all of the attributes of the given domain. DataItem is formally
defined in XML DTD syntax as in Listing 2.
1 <!DOCTYPE TUCON[
2 <!ELEMENT DataItem(ContextElement)>
3 <!ELEMENT ContextElement(EntityID,
AttributeDomainName?, ContextAttributeList,
DomainMetadata?)>
4 <!ELEMENT EntityID(Id, Type)>
5 <!ELEMENT ContextAttributeList(ContextAttribute*)>
6 <!ELEMENT ContextAttribute(Name, Type,
ContextValue, ContextMetadata+)>
7 <!ELEMENT DomainMetadata(ContextMetadata*)>
8 <!ELEMENT ContextMetadata(Name, Type, Value)>
9 ...
10 ]>
Listing 2: XML DTD Definition of Data Item
B. Authorizations
TUCON policies represent constrains based on object at-
tributes, subject attributes and conditions. Authorizations op-
tionally contains following expressions: (i) ATT(O): Temporal
Constraints for temporal granularity, Spatial Constraints for
spatial granularity, and Abstraction Constraints for masking
of certain information. (ii) ATT(S): Actor Type such as insti-
tutional, commercial operators, equipment manufacturers, or
service providers, Monetization describes purposes of using
data such as selling, training, or providing customer supports.
(iii) Conditions: trust values between data owner (trustor) and
data consumers (trustee). Authorization XML DTD definition
is in Listing 3.
1 <!DOCTYPE TUCON[
2 <!ELEMENT Authorization(ATT_O*, ATT_S*,
Condition*)>
3 <!ELEMENT ATT_O( Spatiality*, Temporality*,
Abstraction*)>
4 <!ELEMENT ATT_S( Actor *, Monetization *)>
5 <!ELEMENT Condition(Trust *)>
5https://forge.fiware.org/plugins/mediawiki/wiki/fiware/index.php/NGSI-
9/NGSI-10 information model
6 <!ELEMENT Spatiality(SpatialScope*)>
7 <!ELEMENT Temporality(TemporalScope*)>
8 <!ELEMENT Abstraction(AbstractScope*)>
9 <!ELEMENT Actor(ActorScope*)>
10 <!ELEMENT Monetization(MonetizationScope*)>
11 <!ELEMENT Trust(TrustScope*)>
12 <!ELEMENT SpatialScope(Space?, Slot?, Street?,
Zone?, Any?)>
13 <!ELEMENT TemporalScope(Hour?, Daily?, Weekly
?, Monthly?, Yearly?, Any?)>
14 <!ELEMENT AbstractScope(Detail?, Statistical?,
Any?)>
15 <!ELEMENT TrustScope(Low, Medium, High?, Any?)
>
16 ...
17 ]>
Listing 3: XML DTD Definition of Authorization
C. Obligations
This is a set of actions on DataItems such as Full Access,
Partly Access, Dissemination, Storage, and Analysis. Obliga-
tions actions are associated to Data Monetization. For instance,
if a data consumer requests for selling data, then Obligation
action should be Dissemination; or if the data consumer
requests for statistical training, then Obligation action should
be Partly Access with constrains Temporality = Weekly &
Abstraction = Statistical. XML DTD definition of Obligations
is in Listing 4.
1 <!DOCTYPE TUCON[
2 <!ELEMENT Obligations(Full?, Partly?,
Dissemination?, Storage?, Analysis?)>
3 ...
4 ]>
Listing 4: XML DTD Definition of Obligations
D. Access Rights
Decisions are in accordance with Obligations actions and
Authorization values. We simply define as Permission and
Forbidden reflecting whether DataItems are allowed to ”share”
or not. The word ”share” is more specifically understood in the
TUCON context as: ”allow to conduct appropriate obligation
actions”. AccessRights is defined in XML DTD syntax in
Listing 5.
1 <!DOCTYPE TUCON[
2 <!ELEMENT AccessRight(Rule*)>
3 <!ELEMENT Rule(Obligation?, Authorization?)>
4 ...
5 ]>
Listing 5: XML DTD Definition of Access Right
E. TUCON Formalization and Expression
The formalization is based on DL, a non-monotonic for-
malism with normative conflicts-solving ability and low com-
putational complexity [27]. Particularly, an extension of DL
enriched with model and deontic operators is used as a
formal model for TUCON policies due to its representational
capability of Obligations and Authorization factors [28] [29].
We take several examples to show how DL is applied:
1) Facts: The Facts in DL represent the ATT(O), ATT(S)
and Condition (trust values). For example, two institutional
organizations (IO1 and IO2) with the trust levels as ”High”
and ”Low”, respectively, are represented as below:
F1TUCON(IO1): {ActorScope(Institutional)}
F2TUCON(IO1): {TrustScope(High)}
F1TUCON(IO2): {ActorScope(Institutional)}
F2TUCON(IO2): {TrustScope(Low)}
2) Rules and Superiority Relations: All constrains among
stakeholders, data, actors, conditions and AccessRight are
represented in DL rules. There are three different rules types
that carry different meanings. The strict rules can never be
defeated, while defeasible rules can be defeated by contrary
evidences. Strict rules and defeasible rules are used for draw-
ing conclusion whereas defeater rules are only used to prevent
from making conclusions. Superiority relations of rules are
used to set the priority among these rules and to resolve
conflicts. The following is an example of defeasible rules and
superiority relations of the two institutional actors IO1 and
IO2:
R1TUCON(X): {X[OB] => SpatialScope(Street)}
R2TUCON(IO1): {IO1[OB] => SpatialScope(any)}
R5TUCON(IO2): {IO2[OB] => SpatialScope(Zone)}
R2TUCON(IO2) > R1TUCON(X)
R3TUCON(IO2) > R1TUCON(X)
X represents any institutional actor. OB shorts for Obliga-
tions action, and is a modal operator of the DL extension. The
example is explained as following: by default, any institutional
organization is allowed to conduct OB on data at spatial street
level. However, this policy can be overruled when considering
trust relationship between the actor and the data owner. For
example, if trust value is high, then the actor can access all
spatial level of data (actor IO1) or if trust value is low, then
only zone level of data is permitted.
3) DL Inference Engine and TUCON request: An example
of a consumer X that requests for data with Obligation action
OB is expressed as following:
Rreq.TUCON(X[OB]):{SpatialScope(Street),
TemporalScope(daily),
AbstractScope(detail) =>X[OB]}
A DL inference engine is used to get conclusion that
whether RreqTUCON is defeasible proven in the DL theory
or not. The inference algorithm is based on DL Proof Theory
mentioned in [27]. Several DL reasoners can be applied and
we choose Spindle6 for the demonstration. The conclusion is
as following:
# Conclusions
===================
-D Rreq.TUCON(X[OB])
-d Rreq.TUCON(X[OB])
6http://spin.nicta.org.au/spindle/
showing that the Rreq.TUCON(X[OB]) request is Defeasible
Provable in the DL theory. Thus, the data consumer satisfies
all authorization policies to obligate the action OB on the
stakeholders data, the AccessRight now is Permission. DL
formalism is suitable for usage control since facts, rules are
defeasible that can be overruled by supplying more facts,
rules, and superior relations, resulting in enabling the ability
of continuity of access decisions in TUCON.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have introduced the TUCON usage control mechanism
that leverages a trust service platform to provide securer access
control over data on Smart City based on trust relationships
between data owners and data consumers. Firstly, we present
the trust service platform TAMP in accordance with the
RRK trust model, the trust platform architecture and the trust
formalization. The trust computation implementation based
on semantic-web technologies is also prototyped. Secondly,
we introduce the TUCON conceptual model and architecture
considering trust components in the three-layered Smart City
shared platform. Finally, the practical expression and prototype
for TUCON components are clearly characterized using DL.
There are two main research directions that could be taken
to fulfill the TUCON mechanism. The first direction is the
improvement of the TAMP by developing an automated intel-
ligent rules creation for the trust knowledge base instead of
being predefined. This can be done by using machine learning
techniques for rules pattern recognitions. A verification mech-
anism is also needed to investigate to check the quality of
the knowledge base such as consistency and redundancy. The
second direction is to strengthen TUCON by improving usage
control model, formal model, architecture and enforcement
mechanisms as well as enhancing mutuality of attributes and
continuity of access decisions.
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